Security but not for security’s sake: The impact of social considerations on app developers’ choices by Rauf, Irum et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Security but not for security’s sake: The impact of
social considerations on app developers’ choices
Conference or Workshop Item
How to cite:
Rauf, Irum; van der Linden, Dirk; Levine, Mark; Towse, John; Nuseibeh, Bashar and Rashid, Awais Security
but not for security’s sake: The impact of social considerations on app developers’ choices. In: IEEE/ACM 42nd
International Conference on Software Engineering Workshops (ICSEW’20), May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, Republic of
Korea, IEEE/ACM.




Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1145/3387940.3392230
https://conf.researchr.org/home/icse-2020
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Security but not for security’s sake: The impact of social





















We explore a dataset of app developer reasoning to better under-
stand the reasons that may inadvertently promote or demote app
developers’ prioritization of security. We identify a number of rea-
sons: caring vs. fear of users, the impact of norms, and notions of
‘otherness’ and ‘self’ in terms of belonging to groups. Based on
our preliminary findings, we propose an interdisciplinary research
agenda to explore the impact of social identity (a psychological
theory) on developers’ security rationales, and how this could be
leveraged to guide developers towards making more secure choices.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Developing secure apps is a complex socio-technical activity [6].
From the urgency of getting apps out there, whether to be the first
to capitalize on an innovative idea or simply to meet contractual
deadlines, the complexities of monetization, and a not-entirely un-
common lack of structure in development processes, there are many
things that app developers may be thinking about rather than se-
curity [7]. Previous research has shown that across different kinds
of app development tasks, developers make secure decisions, but
seemingly without having considered security explicitly in their
reasoning [13]. This runs counter to the prediction from a social
debt framework [10]—when the accrued consequences of decisions
involving developer and development community eventually im-
pact the software product. We perform an exploratory qualitative
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analysis of a dataset [14] covering a diverse range of app develop-
ers, focusing in particular on developers who claim to prioritize
security, yet do not articulate security issues in explaining these
choices. We do so to better understandwhy they make the decisions
they do, and what aspects come into play.
2 DATA & METHOD
We analyzed a recent qualitative data set on 44 mobile software
developers’ rationales across different software development ac-
tivities [14]. It provides app developers’ prioritization choices (via
card-sort or selection tasks) of different options impacting software
security for six tasks and the rationales for the choices they make.
Included are (1) setting up an IDE by choosing functionality; (2)
fixing source-code by deciding what flaws to fix first; (3) deciding
where to seek help using an API; (4) deciding whom to involve as
testers; (5) what to consider when selecting an advertisement SDK;
and (6) what clauses to favor for a software license agreement. The
participants were not primed for security and hence were not aware
that different options may differently impact software security.
Approach. The rationale analysis process was iterative. We study
the subset (N=40) of app developers whose choices indicated a
prioritization of security, with rationales that included clear security
consideration and those that did not indicate any clear reflection
about security. Moreover, we consider the different non-functional
requirement (NFR) they prioritized in the data set. Only ten of
the 40 prioritized security as a non-functional requirement (NFR).
One researcher read the developer’s rationales descriptively and
coded the rationales. The codes were classified into a set of themes
which captured the different identified aspects potentially affecting
developers’ reasoning. We identified eight new themes in the data.
Limitations. The coding scheme was discussed with another
author in order to find disagreements and settle a final set of themes.
We later agreed to exclude one theme–‘security as a value’–because
of the lack of common or convergent interpretation of the related
rationales. This analysis has certain limitations, most importantly
that it is a qualitative analysis of human reasoning. Our dataset is
available at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3WHD5. It does not
purport to present generalized claims, but serves as an identification
of key concepts that are worthy of further in-depth study.
3 FINDINGS – FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT
SECURITY REASONING
Two key aspects underpin distinctions identified in the eight newly
identified themes of developers’ rationales:
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(1) whether they had a priori prioritized security as an important
non-functional requirement in an earlier task of the dataset;
(2) whether their reasoning addressed social aspects, comparing
and contrasting users and other developers to themselves.
Across these aspects, both of which present a different lens through
which to analyze the rationales, we identified eighth recurring
themes in developers’ rationales which explain how their reasoning
may affect security rationale, summarized in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: The considerations we identified that a developer
may have towards themselves, users, and other developers.
the developer
the user other developersnorms and values
“this is how 
it’s done”
“what about my reputation?”




















In what follows in Sec. 3.1– 3.2 we explore how the eight identi-
fied themes of developers’ reasoning across these two aspects may
give insight into their (lack) of reasoning about security.
3.1 Prioritizing security from the start (or not)
We noted some differences between those developers who had a
priori prioritized security (10) and those who did not (30). These
thematic differences are described below.
Th.1: Caring for users vs. Fearing them: Several developers
reasoned about their users in order to decide what decisions tomake.
A difference that arose between the developers who prioritized
security was that they seemed more driven by caring for their
users. For example, one participant argued they “wanted to prioritize
things that could help the user” (P5), or “I would not want my users
to experience any negative side effects from the ad library” (P4), to
even placing themselves in the ‘shoes’ of the user: “I prioritized
based on how ‘extortionist’ or ‘evil’ the clauses would feel to me as
a consumer” (P4). Yet, developers who did not prioritize security
seemed more driven by negative feelings of losing their users or
annoying them: “Too many ads distract may annoy users” (P11), or
simply “I don’t want my ads to turn away my users” (P16). Some
reasoned about the impact decisions could have on their reputation:
“/. . . / relying on your users will find you all the bugs, but might lose
you your reputation” (P20). These developers appeared to make
choices driven by a desire to avoid getting into trouble: “At first [I
will] take care for myself and make sure my team is safe /. . . / ” (P21),
and “I can never be sure there aren’t bugs in my code so I put anything
that protects me in that case at the top” (P17). Feelings of care or fear
of negative user response may thus be an important aspect in what
drives them to consider and even act securely, e.g., by considering
secure behavior to be more socially responsible.
Th.2: Security as a norm: Literature has shown that devel-
opers often adopt security practice through peer influence [15],
and subsequently consider them as norms or unwritten standards.
Developers who did not a priori prioritize security considered their
secure choices were simply the norm. For example, participants
noted that security solutions “look[ed] ok like this” (P29), were a
common practice (“It’s common practice, you start from the man-
ual. . . "(P3)) or were simply “common sense”(P28). This may indicate
that developers are not motivated to make secure choices because
they are security conscious per sé, but rather because certain pat-
terns or ways of doing things have become ingrained—which aligns
with efforts by the security community to encourage security prac-
tices in developers by making them common place.
Th.3: Being on your own or in a team: Being part of a team
may provide more structure which in turn leads to more secure
practices and reasoning—simply because there are systems in place
such as code review. This, of course, does not necessarily push de-
velopers to consider security more explicitly, as they might simply
consider it someone else’s responsibility [5], but demonstrates that
our participants at least orientate to the potential scrutiny of others.
Looking at rationale of some of the insecure choices by developers
who prioritize security a priori we see developers may shift from se-
cure choices to insecure choices if they do not consider themselves
part of the team anymore: “If it was a side project, chances are I would
be publishing it as-is, to be as useful as possible immediately, offering
it without any guarantees” (P4) and “Seems like a right approach
for new personal project” (P9). So, having a formal team structure
which means that someone else will see their work clearly does
impact on the way participants make decisions. However, develop-
ers do not need to be part of a team to think about themselves as a
member of a group. Participants sometimes thought of themselves
as member of broader social groups (e.g., being a developer, or an
academic developer), even when they would be working on their
own. Thinking about oneself as a member of such a group enhances
one’s trust in others, as some developers noted: “[I would] try out
the API and discuss with another peer with experience /. . . / or ask the
developer community” (P9), or simply “I would ask other developers I
know” (P27). This indicates that simply imagining themselves as a
group member might raise similar concerns about how others in
the group might evaluate their work.
Th.4: Trusting other developers: As alluded to above, trust in
other developers is an important aspect of how developers reason.
Some literature has shown that developers are more likely to trust
other developers’ opinion if they are of a similar socio-economic
or educational status [15]. We saw that developers, whether they a
priori prioritized security or not, often relied on opinions of other
developers, with conscious awareness of whom to trust and why.
However, they mostly reached out only after trying first themselves.
This motivation to work independently seems influenced by the
need to work efficiently as developers consider asking others to be
more time consuming than trying to search for information them-
selves, e.g.,: “I will ask people I know because it’s easier to communi-
cate efficiently with someone you already know” (P22). Developers
may thus trust other developers working on similar things: “/. . . /
I have fellow devs who have used it”’ (P16)), or who are seen as an
authority on the subject: “I will first consult experts/. . . /”(P31).
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3.2 Thinking about ‘others’ and ‘the self’
We noted further differences in developers’ reasoning when they
were explicitly thinking and classifying themselves or others.
Th.5: Thinking about ‘others’: Developers showed they con-
sidered different groups, most commonly reasoning about ‘the user’.
As noted before, this could be framed both with both positive and
negative valence. For example, for some participants decision mak-
ing was motivated by an intention to maximize positive user expe-
rience: “I wanted to prioritize things that could help the user” (P5).
Some developers considered their users as customers rather than
users—a subtle but important difference which reflects the tension
between seeing others as a beneficiary or a source of revenue. For
example, one participant noted that “Firstly, I should take care of
my business. Secondly, make customers happy” (P24).
When it came to the development and testing process itself,
some participants invoked a number of relevant others (including
‘users’)1. These included, friends, colleagues and family and some-
times even fellow developers. For example, one participant noted
of their tester seeking strategies: “I would ask a few colleagues and
friends to test it first /. . . / If I was able to get a user group to test it
(can be difficult to arrange) then I would, but this is rare” (P6), while
others similarly reasoned about the impact of using those close
to themselves: “I’d want it tested well, so a random user group is a
good start. Another developer might be a better tester, but that’s only
one person. Friends and family are terrible testers, because they don’t
want to hurt your feelings” (P20).
Developers thus seem to reference a variety of relevant ‘others’
when discussing security related decisions. However, participants
were potentially primed to think of ‘others’ in the choices they were
given for the testing task [14]. The way in which these groups are
imagined (for example, whether a user is seen as a user, or more
specifically as a customer; or whether another developer is seen as
a friend or a colleague) will impact the way in which information
is evaluated and priorities are set. Thinking about the relevance of
any one of these groups at a particular time is likely to affect the
decision making process.
Th.6: Thinking about ‘the self’: Another important aspect of
how developers reasoned about their decisions is how they framed
themselves. Sometimes it is clear they are thinking about themselves
as individuals rather than as a member of a social group. This focus
on themselves as individuals can be defensive. In other words,
they can be motivated to act to protect their own self-interest: “I
can never be sure there aren’t bugs in my code so I put [any license
clause] that protects me in that case at the top” (P16). Sometimes this
focus on themselves as individuals can have a positive motivation.
It can reflect a desire for autonomy, and respecting professional
relationships with others: “First I’ll use resources I can use without
the help from other people (their time is important as well)” (P22).
In yet another case, developers may switch from talking about
themselves in the first person to identifying themselves as amember
of a social category. They move from a first person pronoun to a
collective noun–or rather they qualify their self-description by
reference to the social group: “As a developer, I sleep better at night
if I have no knowledge of my user’s passwords” (P5). By prefacing
an account with a claim to group membership (‘as a developer’)
the participant is making a claim to motivation beyond individual
1It should be noted that the task eliciting these rationales presented participants with
a variety of sources, thus potentially priming them to think of social others.
self-interest. Their decision making is shaped by the norms and
values of a social identity. Engaging in practices which violate these
norms would lead to psychological or perhaps moral discomfort.
The same can be said for another developer, who made a slightly
more refined claim to group membership as a specific group mem-
ber: “As a developer at a university that develops apps for its students
to use, this commercial approach is new to me. I guess I would try to be
as responsible as I could be with advertising, though” (P6). Here again,
the participant is describing the origin of the relevant norms and
values (‘to be as responsible as I could be’) and how they are a con-
sequence of their belonging to a group, “developer at a university”
with obligation to a specific other (university students).
Finally, some developers considered themselves as a potential
member of a user group. In other words, they can imagine them-
selves as developers and users at one and the same time. This is an
important observation as it shows how participants can actively
try to switch footing from one identity to another in order to try
and evaluate the impact of decisions they might make: “I priori-
tized based on how ‘extortionist’ or ‘evil’ the clauses would feel to
me as a consumer” (P4). This participant is emphatically imagining
themselves as a consumer rather than a user. Thus, participants
seem to think about themselves at different levels of inclusivity–
sometimes as sovereign individuals and sometimes as members of
social groups. The social groups themselves can be drawn in dif-
ferent ways (as a developer, or as a developer in a university– and
even as a member of an imagined community of consumers). These
different ways of thinking about the self can impact on security
relevant decision-making in different ways at different times.
Th.7: Relying on ‘others’: When seeking help on a confusing
API, a variety of social considerations became apparent, rather
than straightforward technical or functional considerations. Some
participants revealed their desire to work independently: “I like to
try and work things out fully first /. . . / Then ask a local expert” (P6),
while others noted efficiency: “Searching for info in the web is in 99%
of cases faster than asking another person” (P11). Trust, efficiency
and ease of understanding are key aspects here in understanding
why developers reason like this over anything else. Since developers
come from all type of backgrounds and development environments,
their trust in different resources may varingly lead to (in)secure
behavior. When developers are asked on how they seek testers for
their app, they seemed influenced by the trust they have in social
connections rather. For example, one participant noted that “user
groups will be the most honest, friends will be the most dedicated”
(P16), and others noted specifically the concept of friendliness: “A
friendly tester(s) loosely familiar with the concepts of the product will
be likely to explore most of the options within the product”(P33). This
may indicate that developers prioritize social interaction by how
comfortable they are engaging with, and placing trust in, others.
Th.8: Licensing and ‘self’-defensiveness: When developers
were asked to consider what clauses to include in a software license
agreement, they showed little security consideration in their rea-
soning. Rather, it seemed developers focused on avoiding getting
into trouble, such as one participant noting that “liability is the
only one i care about” (P20). Indeed, as another participant noted,
“getting sued is worse than having someone copy your work as far
as I’m concerned” (P27). This hints at developers thinking of how
others might affect them, and push them to be defensive, protecting
their own interests and ability to ‘be’ an active developer, rather
than consider what effect the license might have on the user.
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4 TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA
The aspects of developers’ reasoning that we have discussed above
all share a key thing: social considerations. We propose that re-
search should investigate, in depth, to what extent social consider-
ations may affect both the reasoning about security and eventual
behavior towards security. As Fig. 1’s summary of the relationships
and considerations identified in our analysis shows, developers
have conflicting relationships with both users and other developers,
which manifest in both positive (e.g., caring for, trusting in) and
negative (e.g., fearing, being reluctant to engage) ways. Moreover,
an particularly important relationship is that of the developer with
themselves: the self-reflection, mediated by norms and values their
environment has instilled in them, driving them to reason in a
particular way. This indicates that, depending on the environment
a developer is situated in, there may be many different ‘kinds’ of
typical developers, shaped by their interactions with users, other
developers, and norms and values imposed on them by their wider
environment. In order to understand how these different kinds of
developers can eventually be stimulated to explicitly reason and act
upon security as a key priority, acknowledging and dealing with
that diversity is key. The comparing and contrasting of the self
with their users and developers, and those people affecting the way
developers reason, implies that developers’ social identity may be a
vital construct in order to better understand their reasoning.
The Social Identity Approach (SIA) [3, 4] is the product of four
decades of work on the social psychology of the self and its relation-
ship to groups and group processes. Pioneering work by Tajfel [8, 9]
and Turner [11, 12] demonstrated that our sense of self is not fixed,
but changes as a function of changes in our social context. People
can define (and redefine) themselves along a continuum from a
more idiosyncratic ‘personal identity’ to a more collective ‘social
identity’. At the same time, because multiple group memberships
are available to us, our social identities can also dynamically update
and adapt in their focus. As social contexts change, or as we begin to
think about ourselves in relation to different individuals or groups,
our sense of who we are also changes. This is important because
our identities (personal and social) shape how we make sense of,
and act, in the world. As different aspects of identity become more
or less important to us, so do the values that we prioritize, and the
degree that we can influence (and be influenced) by others changes
so [1]. The Social Identity Approach (SIA) thus offers a psychologi-
cal model that has the potential to explain variation in the way our
participants orientate to decisions that have security implications.
We have seen, in our data, examples of participants talking about
themselves in both personal and social identity terms. We can also
see them talking about different groups to which they can belong,
and different groups with which they can interact. While we can
see variation in the way they talk about and prioritize decisions
that have security implications, we cannot yet make causal infer-
ences between identities and security related decision-making—an
important next step for future empirical work.
A first exploration into social identity in software development [2]
noted that aspects of social identity affect software developers’ be-
havior, and that this holds several implications for effectiveness
of software development that takes place in teams. However, we
also need to understand the wider demographic of app developers
working solo, in not well defined teams, and without established
organizational support—where the ‘others’ are likely even further
removed. Thus, based on our analysis here, we propose several key
research questions which need to be answered to better under-
stand the effect of a wider range of developers’ interaction with,
and consideration of, others, on the security of apps they develop.
• Which, if any, social considerations mediate decisions
made in software development?
• How do software developers identify with their users?
• How do software developers identify with ‘other’ de-
velopers?
• What are the effects of software developers identify-
ing as part of a specific group on their attitude and
behavior?
Conclusion— we identified a number of, primarily social, con-
siderations that software developers exhibit in their reasoning about
common software development activities, all of which may come
in place of explicit security considerations. To understand why this
happens, and how we may move these developers towards security,
interdisciplinary research is needed. Social identity in particular
provides an interesting lens to into the why and how of improving
security choices of developers–and hence security of the resultant
apps on which users increasingly rely in their daily lives.
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